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The commentary acknowledges that my dialogical analysis of rhetorical texts, that is 
of larger sequences of uninterrupted one-way communication from an orator to a 
passive audience is basically convincing. Yet it argues that my analysis proceeds 
from untenable starting points, especially because it allegedly imputes to the 
pragma-dialectical model an entirely dialogical conception of argument. 
 
2.  PRAGMA-DIALECTICS AND ‘MONOLOGUES’ 
 
As far as pragma-dialectics is concerned, I admit that I may perhaps have forced an 
open door. It can’t be denied that even before the introduction of strategic 
maneuvering as an additional, rhetorically based element to the pragma-dialectical 
model, by introducing the term “implicit discussion,” pragma-dialectical theory had 
always basically allowed for its application to what they call ‘monologues.’ Yet this 
does not disprove that the model as such continues to be essentially dialectical, 
since it maintains that even in such texts the argumentative discourse can always be 
reconstructed as a dialogue. I do not deny this; in fact this is what I have tried to do 
in my paper. As a matter of fact, the commentary itself admits that “their theory still 
has a dialectical basis,” and the quotation from van Eemeren (2012, p. 446) 
explicitly speaks of the persistence of “a dialectical framework of analysis.”  
 Yet apart from pragma-dialectics it can hardly be denied that Ralph Johnson’s 
and Douglas Walton’s theories of argument in particular are very strongly dialectical 
(Johnson, 2000; Walton, 1996), far more so than the pragma-dialectical model. 
Walton insists on the presence of the “context of a dialogue” for there to be an 
argument (Walton, 1996, pp. 41). Hence it may have been Walton’s theory more so 
than van Eemeren’s that provoked Blair’s concept of ‘solo arguments’ (Blair, 1998, p. 
333), which I found helpful in bridging the gap between the outwardly monological 
appearance of rhetorical argumentation and its hidden dialogical structure. 
 
3. DIALECTICAL VS. DIALOGICAL 
 
I fully admit, however, that my argument is at times guilty of using the terms 
‘dialectical’ and ‘dialogical’ quite as interchangeably as has rightly been criticized by 
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Blair. I agree that ‘dialectical’ should be reserved for “the properties of all arguments 
related to their involving doubts and disagreements”, and ‘dialogical’ to “turn-taking 
verbal exchanges” (Blair, 1998, p. 337). Had I been more consistent in keeping those 
two terms apart, it might have turned out as a simple result that rhetorical 




All this considered, while I do accept part of the commentary’s criticism, I find little 
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